In March 1968 Stone and his wife encountered martial difficulties. Stone contacted Shaw, the president and general manager of American, and told him that he wanted the pension resolution cancelled. Shaw contacted the company's legal counsel and, acting in accordance with his advice as to the procedure to be followed, prepared a letter from Stone to the board of directors of American, saving, "It is my wish that the Resolution dated December 7, 1967 concerning a pension for my wife Rachel be rescinded." Stone signed and personally delivered the letter to Shaw on March 3.
On March 11, 1968, Shaw convened a special meeting of the board of directors of American. Five of the seven members of the board attended the meeting; and when Stone's letter was brought to their attention, they voted unanimously to rescind the resolution of December 7, 1967. Stone was not notified of the meeting and did not attend.
Stone died on November 1, 1968; and when American refused to pay his widow, Rachel, the pension provided for in the resolution, she sued for specific performance. The trial court ruled that the resolution and been validly rescinded by the board at the meeting of March 11, 1968, and hence the plaintiff had no claim. She appealed the decision.

Eagen, Justice
. . . As a general rule the directors of a corporation may bind a corporation only when they act at a legal meeting of the board. If they purport to act at a meeting which is not a legal meeting, their action is not that of the corporation, and the corporation, absent ratification or acquiescence, is not bound.
As to special meetings of the board of director of a corporation, the general rule in Pennsylvania is that such a meeting held without notice to some or any of the directors and in their absence is illegal, and action taken at such a meeting, although by a majority of the directors, is invalid absent ratification or estoppel. However, this notice requirement may be waived by a director either prior or subsequent to the special meeting, provided such waive is in writing. Additionally, any action which may properly be taken at a meeting of a board of directors of a corporation may be affected and is binding without a meeting, if a consent in writing setting forth the action so taken is signed by each and every member of the board and filed with the secretary of the corporation.
A reading of the trial court's opinion filed in support of its decree upholding the legality of the Board's section of March 11, 1968, rescinding the Board's prior Resolution providing for the payment of the pension to the plaintiff was based on three grounds, any one of which, if corret, would warrant its ruling.
First, the court conclude that Stone's letter of March 3, 1968, constituted a consent to the Board's subsequent action rescinding the pension Resolution. The difficulty with this position is that the applicable statute requires that such a consent be executed after the meeting and that it specifically set forth the action taken, and that it be filed with the secretary of the corporation. Stone's letter does not meet these requirements.
Secondly, the court conclude [that] Stone's letter of March 3, 1968, constituted a waver of receipt of notice of the meeting of March 11, 1968. The difficulty with this position is that the letter does not refer to the meeting or indicatein any way that notice therof is waived. The letter amounts to no more than an expression of desire or consent to rescind the pension Resolution.
In connection with its conclusion that Stone's letter constituted a waiver of notice of the meeting, the court reasoned that no purpose would be served by Stone's presence at the meeting since the other Directors were merely acceding to Stone's wishes and request. This analysis overlooks the rational for the salurary rule that all direcors receive notice of special meeting. That rationale is that " each member of a corporate body has the right of consultation with the others, and has the right to be heard upon all questions considered, and it is presumed that if the absent members had been present they might have dissented, and their arguments might have convinced the majotiry of the unwisdom of their proposed action and thus have produced a different result." We agree with this rationale and, in view of the presumption embodied therein, we cannot concur in the trial court's premise that Stone and other Directors were of one mind as regards the pension rescission. In relation to this, we specifically note that another member of the Board of Directors failed to attend the meeting of March 11, 1968, and there is nothing in the record to show if he received notice of the meeting, or ever consented to the action taken the meeting.
Finally, the court concluded that the rescinding resolution of Board was voidable only and that Stone's silence and failure to object thereto prior to hes death amounted to a ratification. The difficulty with this position is that there is nothing in the record to show that Stone was ever made aware that the meeting of March 11, 1968, had been held or knew the rescinding resolution had been adopted by the Board. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said a ratification was effected...